Outbreaks of health care-associated infections (HAIs) caused by Burkholderia cepacia complex (Bcc) have been associated with medical devices and water-based products. Water is the most common raw ingredient in nonsterile liquid drugs, and the significance of organisms recovered from microbiologic testing during manufacturing is assessed using a risk-based approach. This incident demonstrates that lapses in manufacturing practices and quality control of nonsterile liquid drugs can have serious unintended consequences. Methods: An epidemiologic and laboratory investigation of clusters of Bcc HAIs that occurred among critically ill, hospitalized, adult and pediatric patients was performed between January 1, 2016, and October 31, 2016. Results: One hundred and eight case patients with Bcc infections at a variety of body sites were identified in 12 states. Two distinct strains of Bcc were obtained from patient clinical cultures. These strains were found to be indistinguishable or closely related to 2 strains of Bcc obtained from cultures of water used in the production of liquid docusate, and product that had been released to the market by manufacturer X. Conclusions: This investigation highlights the ability of bacteria present in nonsterile, liquid drugs to cause infections or colonization among susceptible patients. Prompt reporting and thorough investigation of potentially related infections may assist public health officials in identifying and removing contaminated products from the market when lapses in manufacturing occur.
BACKGROUND
The taxonomy of the genus Burkholderia is continually growing and includes >75 species of gram-negative bacteria. 1 Ubiquitous in soil and water, Burkholderia cepacia complex (Bcc) emerged in the health care setting as a significant and transmissible pathogen among pediatric patients with cystic fibrosis. 2, 3 Many outbreaks among noncystic fibrosis patients, including immunocompromised and immunocompetent patients, have been linked to intrinsic and extrinsic Bcc contamination of medical products, such as temperature probes, ultrasound gels, nasal sprays, nebulized or intravenous solutions, mouthwashes, prefabricated wet wipes or washcloths, antiseptics, and disinfectant solutions. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] In February 2016, a pediatric hospital in Texas began an internal investigation of a cluster of patients in the critical care unit with Bcc-positive cultures. 11 Clinical isolates from the hospital were submitted to the University of Michigan Burkholderia cepacia Research Laboratory and Repository for molecular analysis. In May 2016, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was notified by public health officials in Texas and Illinois that the University of Michigan Burkholderia cepacia Research Laboratory and Repository had found that the isolates submitted by the pediatric hospital in Texas were indistinguishable from a cluster of Bcc-positive cultures taken from critically ill, noncystic fibrosis, pediatric patients in Illinois, and that the isolates belonged to a previously undescribed species of Bcc. Within days, the California Department of Health notified the CDC of 2 additional clusters occurring among patients in pediatric critical care units. This suggested that contamination of a widely distributed product could be the common source for these clusters of infections. This report describes the investigation by multiple hospitals, state and local health departments, the CDC, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
METHODS

Identification of clusters
After the initial reports about a possible outbreak of Bcc infections among hospitalized children, the CDC used the Epidemic Information Exchange and the Emerging Infections Network and e-mail distribution lists of clinical professional organizations to request reports of clusters of Bcc infections (ie, ≥2 Bcc infections) among critically ill pediatric noncystic fibrosis patients. This call was broadened to include adult patients after the report of a new cluster among critically ill adult noncystic fibrosis patients. State public health authorities further disseminated requests for reporting of cases within their jurisdictions. During the investigation, the affected pediatric institution in Texas used a reference laboratory to test environmental cultures of specific products and medications used in the care of patients.
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Data collection
Data collection was conducted using a standardized line list. Information about medical devices; procedures; products used for respiratory, oral, and skin care; and intranasal, inhaled, and oral medications was collected. Product information, such as brand and manufacturer, was not always available for respiratory, oral, and skin care products that were thought to have been administered to patients because these types of products are often not charged to patients and their use is often not documented in the medical record. Medication administration and pharmacy records were used to compare the National Drug Code (NDC) of medications.
Case definition
Based on the evolution of epidemiologic and laboratory strain typing data during the outbreak, the case definition was refined during the initial investigation and ultimately included 2 strains of Bcc that were recovered from patient clinical specimens, referred to as strain A and strain B. A confirmed case was defined as the first clinical culture of Bcc matching one of the outbreak strains by molecular typing methods, collected from a hospitalized patient on or after January 1, 2016. A suspect case was defined as a clinical culture obtained since January 1, 2016, yielding Bcc of an unknown strain type in a patient located in a health care facility with confirmed cases or who had exposure to the implicated product.
FDA laboratory methods
The FDA performed culturing of products used in the care of affected patients and identified the manufacturing site of the affected product using the NDC. The FDA identified the manufacturing site of the suspected product using the NDC. The FDA collected environmental samples from the purified water system used for drug production at manufacturer X and product samples obtained at the production site and affected health care facilities. The FDA Office of Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Regulatory Science used both the U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention and the Bacteriological Analytical Manual methodology for testing medical products and cosmetics, respectively. 12, 13 Organisms of interest were Bcc and Pseudomonas aeruginosa. A detailed description of FDA microbiologic laboratory methods used for the specific identification of Bcc is available online in Supplementary Appendix S1.
CDC laboratory methods
The University of Michigan Burkholderia cepacia Research Laboratory and Repository identified the initial isolates among suspect case patients as indistinguishable and noted a wide geographic dispersion. The CDC was notified and state health departments shared these and additional isolates from suspect case patients for confirmatory culture and molecular analysis.
Thirty-one products from affected health care facilities, including liquid docusate, sterile water for inhalation, ventilator circuits, oral care products, bathing wipes, and others, were submitted by state health departments and cultured. Molecular analysis of isolates yielded by clinical and environmental cultures was performed using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and whole genome sequencing (WGS). A detailed description of methods is available in Supplementary Appendix S1. The Tenover criteria were used to interpret the relatedness of the PFGE patterns; patterns were classified as indistinguishable (100% similarity), closely related (1-to 3-band difference), possibly related (4-to 6-band difference), or unrelated (>7-band difference).
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RESULTS
Epidemiologic investigation
As a result of initial reporting and case finding efforts, the CDC investigated >300 reports of positive Bcc cultures and identified 108 cases (63 confirmed and 45 suspect cases) in 12 states (Fig 1) . The age of confirmed and suspect cases ranged from 2 months-85 years (median, 10 years), with 58 (53%) cases occurring among infants and children (ages 2 months-12 years). Clinical cultures yielding Bcc were collected from a variety of body sites, including respiratory, blood, abdominal organ space, urine, stool, and the access site of a peripheral intravenous catheter. Forty-three of the 108 (40%) patients had Bcc cultured from multiple sites ( Table 1) . Four of the 12 (33%) Bcc bloodstream infections were classified as secondary bloodstream infections. Fourteen (22%) individuals with cultures confirmed to be indistinguishable or closely related by PFGE to strain A or B were deceased at the time the report was received.
Cases occurred among patients hospitalized at 16 facilities; 89 of 108 (82%) patients received care in an adult or pediatric critical care unit. Information about medical device use among 84 case patients revealed that 80 (95%) were mechanically ventilated and 41 (48%) had feeding tubes. Other case patient characteristics are presented in Table 1 . Review of products used for oral and skin care did not reveal any common products in use across facilities. The review of oral care products was problematic because of postproduction repackaging of supplies with inclusion of multiple lot numbers by several distributors. Products used in the care of ventilated patients revealed that ventilator circuits and sterile water for ventilation were produced by a common manufacturer, but differences in product models and a lack of microbiologic evidence resulted in none being implicated.
Review of medication administration records revealed that 58 of the 63 (92%) case patients had received liquid docusate sodium bearing the NDC of the implicated product. Thirty-nine (36%) cases were exposed to >1 docusate formulation. Besides docusate, no other common medication exposures were identified.
Clinical and public health laboratory testing
On the evening of June 22, 2016, the Texas Department of State Health Services notified the CDC that the reference laboratory for the affected hospital in Texas had preliminarily identified Bcc in a culture obtained from a prefilled oral syringe containing docusate sodium. The Texas Department of State Health Services submitted isolates from the affected hospital's reference laboratory to the CDC, which confirmed the presence of Bcc in the liquid docusate sodium.
During the course of the investigation, FDA laboratories tested >200 samples (Fig 2) . Bcc was isolated from 24 samples of liquid docusate finished product made by manufacturer X and from their purified water system. Furthermore, 22 samples of the liquid docusate produced by manufacturer X also contained high levels of other microbial organisms, including Candida spp, mold, and Enterobacter spp, with total aerobic microbial counts as high as 40,000 colony forming units/mL. Data about the effectiveness of the preservatives used by manufacturer X to control microbial growth in the implicated liquid docusate product were not available. FDA testing did not detect Bcc or related species from any of the other products analyzed during the investigation.
FDA shared isolates obtained from environmental cultures with the CDC for comparison with clinical isolates. Molecular analysis by the CDC confirmed that isolates obtained from the purified water system at manufacturer X's production facility were closely related to strain A. Isolates yielded by the samples of liquid docusate revealed that they were indistinguishable or closely related to strain A or strain B. Therefore, isolates from manufacturer X's purified water, from the liquid docusate, and from the case patient's clinical cultures were all closely related.
Among the isolates collected from the 63 confirmed cases, 49 (77%) were indistinguishable or closely related to strain A, and 14 (23%) isolates were indistinguishable or closely related to strain B. Each strain was identified from cases from multiple states and from multiple lots of manufacturer X's liquid docusate product (Fig 3) . Of the 31 products cultured at the CDC, including oral and respiratory care kits, and bath wipes from the affected pediatric hospitals, only liquid docusate yielded Bcc.
WGS data were consistent with PFGE results and indicated 2 distinct clusters of Bcc (Fig 4) . The average single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) count between both clusters and PFGE species was widely divergent with 122,355 SNPs over a core genome of 4.1 Mb, which equals 49% of the mapping reference genome. WGS data also revealed a novel Bcc clade (strain A), the genetic diversity of which ranged between 0 and 11 SNPs, identified over a core genome of 5.1 Mb, which equals 62% of the mapping reference genome and translated to a maximum core genome difference of 0.0002%. Isolates from the other cluster represented a Burkholderia contaminans clade (sequence type 102 [strain B]) and had a larger genetic diversity range, from 0-49 SNPs, identified over a core genome of 5 Mb, which equals 61% of the mapping reference genome and translated to a maximum core genome difference of 0.00098%. Additionally, functional pangenome analysis displayed extensive gene content differences between the 2 clades, indicative of 2 distinct Bcc strains.
Termination of outbreak
On June 24, 2016, in response to the initial finding of Bcc in a prefilled syringe containing liquid docusate, the CDC recommended that health care providers not use any liquid docusate products for critically ill, ventilated, or immunosuppressed patients until more information became available. 15 On July 16, 2016, the FDA announced that manufacturer X was voluntarily recalling liquid docusate sodium. 16 Because manufacturer X used the same water system in the production of all of their liquid products, on August 9, 2016, they expanded the recall to include all liquid products made at the site. Manufacturer X also recalled most of their solid products because of separate product quality issues and safety complaints. The last confirmed case of Bcc associated with the outbreak occurred on September 4, 2016. In an effort to fully understand the scope and cause of the contamination issue, the FDA conducted inspections at multiple domestic and international drug manufacturing facilities. On October 12, 2016, the FDA completed their investigation, concluding that poor manufacturing practices and contamination of the purified water supply at manufacturer X were the root causes of the docusate contamination. 16 Identification and removal of the intrinsically contaminated product from the market were essential in terminating the outbreak.
DISCUSSION
We investigated a large, multistate, multihospital outbreak associated with liquid docusate sodium that was contaminated with 2 distinct strains of Bcc. The recognition of unusual clusters of Bcc infections among noncystic fibrosis patients at multiple hospitals followed by identification, and recall of intrinsically contaminated liquid docusate was essential to the detection and control of the outbreak. This and other recent outbreaks highlight Bcc as a frequent and problematic pathogen in health care because of its environmental persistence and tendency to contaminate many types of aqueous solutions. 17, 18 Water is the most common raw material used in the manufacture of nonsterile liquid drugs, which may pose an underappreciated risk for exposure to pathogens resulting in health care-associated infections. 19 The FDA requirements for carefully designed and controlled manufacturing operations that proactively prevent contamination with objectionable microbes are the first line of defense against the contamination of nonsterile drugs. A risk-based approach to evaluating each isolated organism, rather than an exhaustive list of objectionable organisms, is used by manufacturers to determine the safety of nonsterile pharmaceutic products. 20 Manufacturers must assess relevant factors, which include the nature of the raw materials, the processing these will undergo, and the ability of the finished product to support microbial growth. The intended use, the route of administration, and the susceptibility of the population who will use the drug should also be considered. During production and prior to release of the product, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to perform validated microbiologic testing on batches of liquid pharmaceutics to ensure the absence of objectionable microorganisms, such as Bcc. Manufacturers of nonsterile water-based pharmaceutics must pay attention to the possibility of contamination and proactively limit bioburden levels, prevent objectionable contamination, and establish sufficient microbial quality standards for the finished product. This multistate Bcc outbreak among susceptible patients underscores the importance of the manufacturer's responsibility to establish strict specifications for nonsterile drugs that ensure the safety of the full breadth of patient populations using the product. 21 Lapses in current good manufacturing practices and quality control can have serious consequences.
Preservatives used by manufacturer X may not have been sufficient to prevent the proliferation of Bcc or other microorganisms in the finished drug product. This problem could have enabled contaminants to proliferate in the liquid docusate product after release prior to use. Administration of the contaminated liquid docusate to critically ill patients via feeding tubes, coupled with mechanical ventilation, and the risk of aspiration among such patients, may have increased the ability of the organisms to colonize and infect the respiratory tract and spread to other body sites. 22 The intrinsic tolerance of Bcc to commonly used antiseptics and disinfectants is problematic in the health care setting. 23, 24 Bcc can be spread via the hands of health care personnel or mobile medical equipment. Transmission via indirect contact was suspected in one facility in which patients had overlapping stays in the same unit and bed space and in whom exposure to implicated docusate could not be verified. Transmission-based precautions are not routinely recommended for Bcc infections in most settings; however, in an outbreak setting where patient-to-patient transmission is suspected or confirmed, strict adherence to contact precautions accompanied by thorough environmental cleaning may assist in limiting transmission. 25 Several limitations should be noted. Case finding was conducted based on clinical cultures among hospitalized, critically ill patients only and may not have identified all patients who acquired the organism. Reports of infections were submitted on a voluntary basis by acute care facilities, and it is likely that patients in other settings were exposed to contaminated docusate. Clinical information was collected at the time of the report and did not always include the final disposition of the patient; therefore, it is not known how many deaths were directly or indirectly attributed to this outbreak. Finally, confirmed cases among infants and children may have been detected at an increased rate because this organism is readily recognized as a threat among pediatric patients. A higher proportion of adults were classified as suspect cases; isolates were not retained by reporting facilities for confirmation.
Clinician recognition and reporting of unusual clusters of infections is an important component of identifying contaminated drug products and their removal from the market. This outbreak investigation was aided by ongoing surveillance to detect clusters of common strains within the Bcc at the University of Michigan Burkholderia cepacia Research Laboratory and Repository. Prompt reporting to the CDC and collaboration among private and public, regulatory and nonregulatory agencies resulted in the removal of the implicated product from patient care, preventing additional cases.
